G is our information in the sense that for all A∈G, we know whether ω∈A.
Let us use the Tickets in a box metaphor, extended to handle σ-algebras so that the ticket mentions for all A∈F whether the outcome represented by the ticket belongs to A. Now, say that someone else picks the ticket and we don't see it. For any A∈G we may ask whether the ticket says that the outcome is in A and the person holding the ticket tells us. However, if we ask about some A∈F∖G, we hear "Sorry, you don't know that".
Larger σ-algebra is more information
This also explains why moving to G′⊃G means gaining new information -- now we still get answers to [X∈A?]-questions about anyA∈G and additionally to some new questions -- those where A∈G′∖G.
Random variables
So, the tickets also contains the values of random variables. If the random variable X is G-measurable, we get answers to all our questions about its value, such as [is X equal to 3], since by G-measurability of X, {ω∣X(ω)=3}∈G. Or, to handle the delicacies of the uncountable case, we may also ask [Is X in the set B]? (Since for any particular value we think about, the probability of hearing "yes" may be 0 and that would be boring). So, in this sense we have all information about the realization of the random variable, if our information is G and the RV is G-measurable.
Caveat: the definition of measurability of random variables restricts the sets B we may ask about. [Is X(ω)∈B] is answered if B is a measurable set in the value space of the random variable (usually Borel σ-algebra is assumed with R without mentioning). So, in the uncountable (nondiscrete X) case, don't ask whether X is in the Vitali set or the oracle holding the ticket shall be mad.
Reference
I did not cite any reference in the answer but I consulted
- J. Jacod and P.E. Protter. Probability essentials (2nd edition), Springer, 2004
about the definition of measurability of random variables. (And have learned these things from the same book previously, if I recall correctly).